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Nathalie Tocci is director of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, a part-time professor at the European University Institute and a Europe’s Futures fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences. Her latest book, “A Green and Global Europe,” is out with Polity.
A euroskeptic leopard doesn’t change its spots — it just shifts tactics, slyly and opportunistically, as it circles its prey.
It was the arrival of Brexit and the election of former U.S. President Donald Trump that marked its first official appearance. And much like today, Italy was at the forefront then too. The country had its first ever unapologetically euroskeptic government with the unholy marriage of Matteo Salvini’s the League and the 5Stars party — a coupling of the populist left and right. It was a government that went as far as questioning Italy’s place in the eurozone, and possibly even the EU.
But with Brexit turning into such an unmitigated disaster for the U.K., and the EU stepping up during the pandemic to show what it can do in an emergency, the Continent’s euroskeptics learned a lesson. They learned to no longer want to exit the EU.
And while many in the pro-European mainstream saw this as a hopeful sign of moderation, it actually makes the current moment much more dangerous for European integration than before.
Italy’s government, led by Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, became the poster child of this apparent conversion, quickly adopting a reassuringly pragmatic and conciliatory tone. Meloni herself pursued a relatively responsible fiscal policy, and adopted a pro-Ukraine and very much transatlantic stance upon taking office. She seemed to want to help and be constructive rather than iconoclastic.
Her rapport with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen — largely due to their convergence on migration and ways of curbing it — was flagged as evidence that Meloni had become, for want of a better word, “house-trained.” And yet, during the lead up to the recent European Parliament election, Meloni’s campaign billboards were not only plastered with her glittering and confident smile but with the slogan “Italy changes Europe.”
Indeed, far from buying into the EU project, Meloni and her fellow euroskeptics now want to “change” it from within, extracting benefits while hollowing out its real spirit of unification.
This is, of course, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s tested and persistent tactic. Hungary’s presidency of the Council of the EU is encapsulated in the Trumpian slogan “Make Europe Great Again.” But the Europe he and Meloni envision isn’t one of deeper political integration — quite the reverse.
However, the euroskeptics in Budapest or Bratislava don’t have the clout to hollow out the EU on their own. But if joined by founding members like Italy, and perhaps The Netherlands, their promise — or threat — of turning the bloc into a “Europe of nations” becomes ever more possible. Plus, for the right-wing populists determined to cut the EU off at its knees, the surge of National Rally seats in the French parliament and the recent triumph of left-wing populist Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the country’s snap elections aren’t such a setback either — they can rely on him to harry Brussels as well.
Given all this, as well as the prospect of Trump’s reelection, Meloni’s mask is starting to slip. Just think of how Rome stood against Ukraine’s use of Western-supplied weapons on Russian soil, its supposed insistence on diluting language on abortion and LGBTQ+ rights at the G7 summit in Apulia, or its refusal to ratify the European stability mechanism.
Moreover, Meloni’s abstention on von der Leyen’s reappointment as Commission president, as well as her vote against former Portuguese Prime Minister António Costa as European Council president and Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas as High Representative, are signs she hasn’t been house-trained at all. Rather, she’s starting to feel emboldened.
In the same vein, upon Meloni’s instruction, her Brothers of Italy party voted against von der Leyen’s reelection in the European Parliament last Thursday. And if Trump is reelected in November, the remaining constraints and feints will fade. Meloni was on her best behavior before, but now she’s starting to switch tactics in anticipation of Europe’s “new right” gathering pace and the return of a fellow predator in Washington.
Overall, there’s much that divides Europe’s new right parties, but banking on these differences and trying to exploit them in order to protect the European project is risky. So, rather than distinguishing between the moderate and radical hard right, it may well be more useful — and certainly wiser — to distinguish between those among them that are incremental in their approach, like Meloni, and those that are hasty. For it is precisely because the tactics of the former are smarter that they could be far more dangerous.