Western Europe can’t ignore its eastern allies

Artin DerSimonian is a junior research fellow in the Eurasia program at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft.

It is a truism of diplomatic history that if a country or alliance is to reach a compromise peace with an adversary, it must first feel sufficiently secure itself. Hence, senior diplomat Thomas Graham’s suggestion that in order to manage this critical period on the Continent, “the long-term U.S. goal should be the resurrection of a security system based on cooperation with Russia but, perhaps paradoxically, the path to it runs through a near-term effort to secure Europe against Russia.”

Indeed, the last two years of war in Ukraine have accentuated fears in neighboring countries that share a border with Russia. All these fears center on a potential Russian invasion or attack, and though they may be misplaced — considering Russia’s military failures in Ukraine — they are, due to historical reasons, etched in the public consciousness.

However, during my recent discussions with experts across Central and Eastern Europe, it was generally clear that following Russia’s invasion, many in these countries felt their fears were vindicated — and that Western Europeans had ignored them all too easily.

And now these concerns have to be addressed, albeit not in the maximalist manner that some local and Washington hawks seem to advocate.

Unsurprisingly, the Baltics have so far emerged as the loudest backers of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union and NATO. Poland is one of Ukraine’s top supporters, providing weapons and supplies to Kyiv, offering refuge to over a million Ukrainians, and allowing the use of Polish territory for the transportation of Western military supplies into Ukraine.

However, Ukraine’s 2023 offensive has now clearly failed, with the fight locked in a stalemate at best and heading toward Russian victory at worst. As such, Western European countries and the U.S. seem to have tacitly accepted the eventual need for negotiations and some form of territorial compromise. And as hopes of Ukrainian victory fade even further, pressure for a negotiated peace is bound to increase.

Any moves toward a cease-fire will face strong opposition from many Poles and Balts, however, as they will instinctively feel this is a sign that the West is abandoning them. An argument expressed ad nauseam during my discussions in Poland and Lithuania was the fear that Western European countries simply don’t care enough about securing the territory of their eastern allies. And several interlocutors stressed that enhanced deterrence in Central and Eastern Europe is more crucial to their national security than seeing Ukraine reclaim all its occupied territories.

Reassuring these countries about their own security could, therefore, play a useful role in diminishing their opposition to a compromise peace in Ukraine.

One way of addressing this anxiety would be through a European-centered deterrence strategy, which seeks to assuage these fears without unnecessarily provoking Russia. After all, Russian security elites worry far more about U.S. troops on their borders than they do about European units. And having signaled their interest, France and Germany are now moving in this direction — albeit slowly.

The German army brigade to be permanently stationed in Lithuania in a few years’ time is one example of this, and it would help “lessen our fears,” renowned Lithuanian security expert Margarita Šešelgytė told me. And while France’s increasing presence in the region is also cause for optimism, for any real change in Europe’s defense posture along its eastern borders, there remains significant work to be done.

For instance, deploying one brigade, even a “robust” one, in the words of German Minister of Defense Boris Pistorius, would be a useful tripwire to ensure a Russian attack would automatically trigger a NATO response. This wouldn’t necessarily be all that impressive in military terms, but since there is, in fact, very little risk of Russia invading the Baltics or Poland and ensuring a disastrous war with NATO, a small European force could reassure eastern allies without angering Moscow the way a U.S. force would.

Europe also need to establish joined-up military production | Petter Berntsen/AFP via Getty Images

Furthermore, enhancing European-led deterrence in Central and Eastern Europe is something the U.S. should encourage and support as well. It would not only alleviate the burden on American troops and financial resources, but it would encourage Europeans to reinvigorate their armed forces and play a more serious role in the Continent’s security too.

Alongside an increased military presence, Europeans also need to establish joined-up military production. At present, Europe can’t even produce the million artillery shells it promised to deliver Ukraine by March. Therefore, enhancing production in a Pan-European manner would better position it for any future crisis or conflict, while offering reassurance to its eastern allies as well. The EU already has existing mechanisms, such as Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defense Fund, which should help boost such development. And in this case too, strengthened defense capability could lessen Western Europe’s fear of Russia, thereby encouraging a willingness to seek reasonable compromises with Moscow.

Having the luxury of relying on America, many European countries have viewed security almost as an afterthought since the end of the Cold War. But several of the experts I spoke to stressed that with Washington’s future strategic commitment uncertain, it’s now high time Europe starts doing much more for its own defense. Moreover, given the very widespread, and justified, feeling in the U.S. that Europeans are “free riding” on their military spending — as even former President Barack Obama noted — this is a necessary step if any U.S. presence and support is to be guaranteed in the long term.

Lastly, in order to ensure the disagreements likely to emerge from a settlement over Ukraine don’t become toxic, Germany and France need to be more open to the perspectives and fears of their eastern allies.

Along these lines, the experts I spoke to felt that with a new, Brussels-friendly government in Warsaw, now is the time to reinvigorate the Weimar Triangle — an informal grouping of Berlin, Paris and Warsaw launched over 30 years ago. And as the involvement of Poland — where pro-U.S. and pro-NATO views remain strong — may help lessen Washington’s worries about a European go-it-alone project, the U.S. should encourage this too.

Of course, a stronger role for Poland in the EU brings the risk of even greater EU hostility toward Russia along with it. However, as the question of EU membership for Ukraine becomes more salient, it’s possible Poland would come to take a more nuanced position on its unconditional support for Ukraine. As Andrzej Bobinski, managing director of Polityka Insight in Warsaw, told me: “Poles are generally supportive of Ukraine because they are fighting Russia … not because of an actual love for Ukraine.”

Poland’s ongoing grain dispute with Ukraine and the truckers’ blockade of the Ukrainian border are harbingers of what could become serious opposition to the reforms and enormous costs involved in the country joining the bloc. And the Weimar format would present an avenue to lay the groundwork for these extremely complex and difficult changes.

* These impressions and comments are the result of a research trip to Poland, Lithuania and Hungary during November 2023 where the author met with dozens of foreign and security policy experts.