What the China-Russia alliance means for the West

Hugo von Essen and Andreas Umland are analysts at the Stockholm Centre for Eastern European Studies (SCEEUS) in the Swedish Institute of International Affairs.

Over the years, Beijing and Moscow have slowly created what now appears to be an anti-American and anti-liberal global front, bound together by their desire to revise not only the status of Ukraine and Taiwan but the current world order.

Russia may thus continue receiving considerable — and possibly even greater — help from China, which could keep its economy afloat and its war against Ukraine going for many years to come.

To be sure, Beijing’s interests still differ from Moscow’s in several respects. Greater Chinese support for Russia is risky for its already crisis-prone economy, should the West extend sanctions against its banks and companies. And for the first time since mid-2022, in March and April of this year, Chinese exports to Russia fell compared to the same months the year before, reflecting growing caution — as well as the payment problems faced by Russian importers due to increasing pressure from the U.S.

Notwithstanding such developments, however, we should all be skeptical of Beijing’s official would-be pacifist rhetoric. The country’s long-running systematic support for Russia indicates an interest in keeping the confrontation going — and reaping the economic and geopolitical advantages.

After all, the war in Europe ties up Western resources and diverts Washington’s attention from Beijing’s activities in other parts of the world. Russia’s dependency on China is already high, and it continues to grow as Chinese companies replace Russia’s former Western trade and investment partners.

In fact, China’s relative power vis-à-vis Russia is increasing with every month of war. As the Russian arms industry’s burgeoning weapons and ammunition production generates pseudo-growth, masking an actual economic decline, China’s economy — though also shaken by difficulties — continues to grow. China is also able to import discounted Russian raw materials, while flooding the country with its consumer goods.

In addition, Moscow has been gradually allowing more of its latest military technologies to be transferred to China too. While not an outright vassal state, Russia has no choice but to meet Beijing’s increasing demands — whether they concern discounts on energy prices, Chinese presence in Central Asia or support for Chinese hegemonic ambitions in Southern and Eastern Asia.

Meanwhile, Beijing wants Moscow to neither completely win nor lose in Ukraine. A Russian victory with Chinese support would strengthen Moscow, yet deeply alienate the West from Beijing. A Russian defeat would destabilize Putin’s regime and could trigger its political transformation or even destruction. This, in turn, could lead to reduced access to cheap energy, Russian markets, the Arctic and military-technological secrets for China, as well as the loss of its primary partner in its long-term strategic rivalry with the U.S.

In view of such interests, one shouldn’t take China’s calls for peace seriously. For over a decade now, Beijing has been manifestly violating its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) by supporting Russia. Largely forgotten, China proclaimed its respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty and borders both in 1994, with Ukraine’s accession to the NPT, and in 2013, as part of the fully ratified Sino-Ukrainian Friendship Treaty. Since 2014, however, Beijing’s sham neutrality — and its economic assistance to Moscow — has been crucial for Russia’s radical revision of state borders in Europe.

And for the first time since mid-2022, in March and April of this year, Chinese exports to Russia fell compared to the same months the year before. | Stringer via Getty Images

Worse, as Russia’s genocidal war against Ukraine continues to unfold, Beijing has been providing more rhetorical support for its apologetic narratives. This includes, for instance, Moscow’s allegedly “legitimate security concerns,” as well as the Kremlin’s purposeful (mis)interpretation of the concept of “indivisible security” as a central part of its own foreign policy, blaming the West for both the war in Ukraine and tensions in the Indo-Pacific.

It’s remarkable just how far Beijing has gone to support Moscow despite the negative repercussions for its relations with the West and the possible economic consequences. The country is now faced with growing risk of a trade war with the U.S.

Today, Beijing and Moscow project the image of a united, formidable and stable anti-democratic, anti-American coalition, which also includes notorious rogue states like Iran, North Korea or Syria. Yet, the potential for cracks in this informal alliance is also obvious. For instance, Russia’s growing ties with an emboldened North Korea could lead to a difficult menage-á-trois, as Beijing has long struggled to control North Korea.

Last but not least, as Matthew Kroenig outlines in his book “The Return of Great Power Rivalry,” one should not forget that autocratic regimes suffer from volatility in their foreign and domestic affairs. World history shows that open political systems with rule of law and pluralism are more effective domestically, and at handling international conflicts with enemies and tensions with foreign allies.

Against this backdrop, it’s important the West maintains its resolve and unity. In concrete terms, this means providing Ukraine with all the support it needs — today. A Ukrainian victory on the battlefield achieved through Western support, and the restoration of the country’s territory, will be the best way of containing Russia’s and China’s revisionism.